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The moral order in family mediation: negotiating competing values 
 
Abstract 
We used Discourse Analysis to study how mediators and parties negotiate competing 
priorities and values during the family mediation process. We drew on understandings of 
practical morality, and specifically the concept of a moral order, to study UK mediation 
session talk.  Our analysis highlighted the contradictory moral orders drawn on by parties and 
mediators. The saliency of moral categories and concerns in parenting is demonstrated, and 
we consider the problems this causes in the “no fault” context of mediation.  
 
Keywords: Family Mediation, Discourse Analysis, Moral Order. 
 
Introduction 
In the UK family mediation system, separating adults attend mediation sessions with 
the goal of reaching an agreement about finances and/or child contact arrangements after 
separation or divorce. This is facilitated by a mediator, trained by one of a number of 
mediation organizations.  A core aim of mediation, which is highlighted in the training, is the 
importance of neutral or impartial facilitation which enables participants to come to their own 
decisions (Family Mediation Council 2016). However, mediators are also encouraged to steer 
participants towards a “fair” outcome in terms of sharing financial assets, and care of children 
(Webley 2010; Robinson 2012).  They are moreover supposed to ensure that, for parents, the” 
best interests” of the child or children are prioritised.   
A dilemma in all types of mediation is therefore how to balance a neutral or impartial 
facilitation which enables participants to come to their own decisions, with a more directive 
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approach which attempts to steer participants towards what lawyers would consider a fair 
outcome (Webley 2010; Robinson 2012). In practice, mediators need to manage these 
competing expectations, or to prioritize some over others (Greatbatch and Dingwall 1989).  
This tension between several of the core values of mediation is noted in training and 
reflection on practice, but there is little detail in training manuals about how mediators might 
attend to competing expectations and values during the mediation process itself.   
Features of mediation talk 
Mediation shares some general characteristics of institutional talk (Drew and Heritage 1992), 
and with counselling and therapy encounters in particular. In common with other counselling 
and therapy encounters, in mediation there is an interactional asymmetry between practitioner 
and participant(s), lay versus professional, which sets up and is characterized by specific 
turn-taking procedures, agenda-setting, formulation and preferred types of responses 
(Heritage and Greatbatch 1989; Mondada 1998; Hutchby 2005).  It is goal-oriented, with 
some forms of talk permitted and others discouraged, and participants attend to their 
institution-relevant identities (e.g. as mediators or as parties).  The mediators are trained to 
adhere to a code of practice, which includes a set of explicitly laid out mediation ideals and 
norms, although, as previous studies have demonstrated, there are often gaps between 
normative ideals and actual practice (Garcia 1991; Dingwall and Greatbatch 1993; 
Greatbatch and Dingwall,1997).  In particular, the concept of mediator neutrality has been 
shown to be difficult to achieve in practice in various studies (Cobb and Rifkind 1991; 
Greatbatch and Dingwall 1999; Jacobs 2002). Mediators, in common with therapists and 
counsellors, often struggle with talking about responsibility and behavior in a “non-blaming” 
neutral setting, and particularly when they are dealing with two parties, or clients, at once in a 
multi-party situation (Patrika and Tseliou 2016).  Kelly (1983) outlined some of the key 
distinctions between mediation and therapy – in particular, the selectivity of focus in 
4 
 
mediation, and the orientation to outcomes; “The goal is not to cure the conflict but to 
redirect and manage it sufficiently well to enable the couple to reach agreement (Kelly 1983, 
38). However, Kelly also  noted that mediation is on a continuum, with some practitioners, 
who may be trained therapists, more focused on emotional issues and others (often trained 
solicitors) concentrate on legal aspects.   Some researchers, such as Tjersland (1997), have 
explored how mediators might deal therapeutically with emotional issues in the mediation 
process. However, Merry (1990) argued from an ethnographic study of US mediation talk 
that the mediation setting itself encourages “rival ways of talking about problems and events” 
(Merry 1990, 3), which she identified as moral, legal and therapeutic discourses. She 
demonstrated how both mediators and parties switch between these discourses “when one 
seems unproductive or leads to trouble” (Merry 1990, 4), but she found that the moral 
discourse predominated in (US) mediation settings.  Baitar, de Mol and Rober 2016) argued 
that we should take a relational approach and acknowledge the interplay of complex and 
contradictory processes which may occur during mediation (Baitar, de Mol and Rober 2016). 
An investigation of some of the complex and contradictory aspects within the mediation 
dynamic may offer insights to mediators and training organizations.  
Values and morality discourses in mediation: the Moral Order 
In contrast to studies focusing on how mediators talk “about” their mediation 
practices or values, we use Discourse Analysis (DA) to attend to the details of talk in 
mediation sessions, (e.g. Dingwall and Greatbatch 1993; Greatbatch and Dingwall 1997; 
Stokoe 2013; 2014). This approach is particularly suited to study tensions between competing 
values (Jacobs 2002). Webley assessed UK mediator training; and concluded that the training 
is primarily “values and skills-based”, with priority being given to a “consensus-based 
approach” (Webley 2010, 126), even though this may lead to what family lawyers consider an 
unfair settlement. Bergmann (1998) wrote that “in health care, in social work and education, 
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in counselling and therapy, [practitioners] have taken on tasks that traditionally involve moral 
issues. However, they work within institutions that function according to "rational" models 
and criteria, and they therefore are officially constrained to "demoralize" issues, couching 
them in terms of scientific or bureaucratic rationality, and taking a "neutralistic" stance with 
respect to the problems they deal with” (Bergmann 1998, 291).  
In this paper we explore how these contrasts between competing values are exhibited 
and dealt with in mediation sessions where parents discuss child arrangements after 
separation. Our discursive approach draws on understandings of practical morality that is, 
morality is practically realized in the practices of self-presentation and face work (Goffman 
1959; Garfinkel 1967; Bergmann 1998; Sterponi 2003), also sometimes termed “mundane 
morality” (Stokoe and Edwards 2015).  We draw on the concept of the moral order, which 
has been used by researchers in a number of studies of talk in therapeutic and counselling 
institutions. Wahlström (2016) describes the moral order as “more or less articulated and 
shared understandings of what is valued and what is not, what are the loyalties, duties, and 
responsibilities expected from the partners, and the grounds for evaluating actions. It also 
includes expectations concerning how value, concern, and respect are communicated” 
(Wahlström 2016, 149).  The concept of a moral order has been taken up by discourse 
analysts, as it provides a way of understanding value-based discourse as a “continually 
constructed and renegotiated understanding of rights and responsibilities, good and bad” 
(Kurri 2005, 11). Kurri and Wahlström (2001; 2005) showed how counsellors managed to 
stay neutral yet give advice by marking the act of preferring charges with delicate discursive 
devices, simultaneously giving space to the impression of the private sphere of family and 
marriage as a domain of autonomy and inviolability, while producing counselling as a 
domain of power and interference with the client’s autonomy. Hutchby and O’Reilly (2010) 
demonstrated how participation in family therapy sessions is informed by differing agendas 
6 
 
and a “familial moral order”.  Cromdal and Tholander (2014) argued that “when engaging in 
agreements or disagreements, when questioning or accounting for certain forms of behavior, 
when praising, blaming or otherwise assessing their own and one another’s actions, members 
invariably invoke and reflexively produce moral orders” (Cromdal and Tholander 2014, 10). 
Features of moral talk which indicate the moral order can be direct, e.g. by morally loaded 
vocabulary (Bergmann 1998), or indirect, “traces of morality” such as expressing disapproval 
or offering sympathy on telephone helplines (Potter and Hepburn 2015).  
Family mediation talk covers value-laden topics such as responsible parenting, fair 
division of finances, elements with strong moral expectations, and the mediator needs to 
navigate this emotionally fraught territory to facilitate the parties to reach an agreed outcome 
in terms of child contact and financial arrangements after a separation or divorce.  
Consideration of the moral order in mediation discourse gives us a way of understanding how 
explicit and implicit societal norms around family, parenting, divorce, marriage, gender and 
the role of the law affect the mediation process.  
Data  
The data studied here is from mediation sessions involving adults attempting to agree 
about child contact arrangements after separation or divorce, facilitated by a trained mediator.  
The data come from a three-year, ESRC-funded academic research project undertaken by the 
Universities of Exeter and Kent.  We conducted a national survey of out of court dispute 
resolution awareness and experiences, an individual interview study with 95 people who had 
experienced an out-of-court family dispute resolution process between 1996-2013, and 40 
individual interviews with practitioners of dispute resolution processes.  The findings from 
the survey and interview data are fully described in Barlow, Hunter, Smithson and Ewing 
(2017); see also Hunter, Barlow, Smithson and Ewing  (2014; 2015). For the final phase of 
the study we audio-recorded 25 dispute resolution sessions, including nine mediation sessions 
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involving five couples.  In this paper we consider data from the recorded mediation sessions. 
Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Exeter, and all participants were 
provided with information beforehand about how their data would be used, and consented to 
this.  All names and identifying features have been changed.  
Discourse Analytic approach 
In this paper we use a Discourse Analysis (DA) framework to study participants’ talk 
about values, morals expectations and ideals in family mediation sessions.  In DA, talk is 
treated as a social action through which participants use a range of discursive devices to 
explain, justify, give and refute advice and make persuasive arguments.  In our analysis we 
attended to the function of discourse: what is accomplished by a particular discursive 
construction, as evidenced in the participants’ response?  Another feature of DA which we 
draw on here is the acknowledgement, or the expectation that there can be several competing 
and contradictory discourses operating concurrently in a given situation (Locke, 2009). DA 
can help us consider how these are managed concurrently. For example, how do mediators 
and parties negotiate the competing, and contradictory expectations inherent in the mediation 
process?  Finally, an investigation and acknowledgement of power dynamics is important to 
DA (van Dijk 1993), and we consider the power dynamics of these mediation encounters 
(Winslade 2006), and the ways in which discourse structures “enact, confirm, legitimate, 
reproduce, or challenge relations of power abuse (dominance) in society” (van Dijk 1993, 
467),  In a discursive approach, a single or few cases, analyzed in detail, are assumed to shed 
light on widespread practices and assumptions, and also highlight future areas of study 
(McHoul and Rapley 2005).  The examples of mediation session talk included here have been 
selected to illustrate instances of moral positioning by parties or mediators, and instances of 
competing sets of values, or tension between values and practice.  We looked for: 1) 
examples of expectations and orientation to particular goals or values at the start; 2) direct 
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reference to values or morality during sessions; and 3) value-oriented strategies which 
mediators used when parties did not manage to agree. 
Analysis 
1. Values and norms in agenda setting 
In these UK family mediation sessions, both parties will normally have previously 
attended separate Mediation Information and Assessment Meetings (MIAMs).  The first joint 
mediation session typically starts with an introduction to the session format, signing an 
agreement, and setting out expectations.  Extract 1 is the point early in this mediation session 
when the general introduction to the format is over and the mediator moves on to the couple’s 
agenda: 
Extract 1: Jordan and Nicola (9 minutes into session) 
1. Med Ok (.) um so what (.) I mean in terms of an a:genda here because it’s up to  
2.                you to set the agenda for today and (.) I know I know that you both want to  
3.  talk about [child] and the arrangements for him but are there any specifics I  
4.                don't want to get to the end of the session and you say, actually we haven’t  
5.                mentioned that incident that happened last Friday and (.) you know it was  
6.  really difficult (.) So is is it just the arrangements for [child] or is there  
7.                anything else that you would like to talk about 
8. Jordan  No no (0.2)  
9. Med Nicola? 
10. Nicola No, well uh uh Jordan initiated this mediation session so (0.2) 
11. Med Yeah 
12. Nicola so (.) um (0.2) and I only obviously got clarification in terms of what (.) um  
13.                what he was looking for when I came for my pre (.) meeting (0.2) 
14. Med Ok  
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15. Nicola So:o um I am assuming it’s just (.) that it is contact arrangements 
16. Jordan It’s um it’s always contact arrangements the discussions that  
17. Nicola Yeah 
18. Jordan  basically we have is  
19. Nicola contact yeah 
20. Jordan  about contact and ongoing so (.) 
21. Nicola  So specifically probably I would like to cover Christmas as part of that 
22. Med Oka:ay so that would be good to get that discussed whilst you are here   
 
Here the mediator introduces the idea of having an agenda for the session (line 1), 
and tells the parties it is “up to you” to set the agenda, but immediately (line 2) adds “and I 
know that you both want to talk about the child”. The expectation for the session is: there will 
be an agenda, but the parties set it (and this will have been discussed in the separate MIAMs 
before the joint mediation); however there is an expected content which has a strong moral 
tinge – cooperative participants in family mediation will orient to their child’s contact 
arrangements.  It may be that the mediator is referring here to priorities raised in the MIAM. 
This opening, while ostensibly giving choice to the parties, is also a reminder of the agenda in 
the mediator’s view, and the appropriate topics in this type of activity.  Then the mediator 
offers a chance to add “specifics”. One party (Jordan) immediately agrees to this proposed 
agenda without additions (line 8). The mediator then asks the other party, Nicola, directly, 
and her response makes her sense of limited agency clear: “No, well, Jordan initiated this 
meeting”. Her next comment “I only obviously got clarification” draws attention to her late 
knowledge of the process and issues.  Nicola thus highlights her lack of agency and outsider 
status in the mediation process, positioning herself as less knowledgeable, in contrast to 
Jordan.  Garcia (1991) outlined the interactional techniques which participants use to 
10 
 
construct effective opening statements in neighborhood mediation – crucial in setting up 
positions and aligning oneself in a particular way, and relevant for the mediator’s efforts to 
balance power between disputants.  Having highlighted her outsider status, Nicola then does 
add to the agenda, and the mediator takes this up as relevant, thus carefully involving the 
reluctant participant with a “subtle nudge” (Potter and Hepburn 2015) towards appropriate 
involvement.  
Extract 2: Martha and Jacob (5 minutes into session) 
1. Med     ... we are here today really to talk about the uh current arrangements (.)  
2.              uh we can wind that out to your role as parents, your communication  
3.              um and uh whether there are any concerns, the welfare of the kids uh  
4.              but (.) focusing perhaps primarily on what the mediation was set up  
5.              for (.) which is to see what the arrangements are for the children and  
6.               whether they’re uh whether they are the right ones and what your  
7.               thoughts and feelings are about that (.) Uh, so would you both like to  
8.               sort of say (.) really what you hope to achieve from this meeting? (0.2) 
9. Jacob:    Me, um I mean as I said before I just want to understand the reason  
10. (.) why Martha is refusing (.) the kids to come over to my place and  
11. also recently I have asked if we can extend the hours (.) at least to 4 
12. hours and to see the kids (.) every week, more like every weekends (.) 
13. um just to build up my relationship with the kids as well and also  
14. change the locations (0.2)  I just want to get a clear understanding why  
15. she is refusing that and is there anything we can do to, to make it better (0.3) 
16. Med     Um (.) well don’t you well um you can either sort of directly respond to  
17.               that or say if there is generally other things that you would like to focus on  
18.               as well. 
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19. Martha  Uh. For the contact center we have already discussed that with the solicitors  
20.               and (.) uh Mr O’Neil here he knows the reason why we (.) uh we can't  
21.               change the contact center, one being that the cost of the one that he chose  
22.               it was too high (…) it is very expensive compared to where I am paying at  
23.               the moment (.) uh the reason why the kids cannot come overnight he or to  
24.               his place he hasn’t mentioned that before but privately Mr O’Neil knows why 
25.               the kids can't go to his house because of my belief and because of the moral  
26.               of how I am raising the children and I just believe that the children are very  
27.               young to be exposed to um (.) the kind of lifestyle that he is living (.) um I  
28.               am not judging, I am not condemning (.) but he has chosen what to live, how  
29.    he wants to live.   
 
In this extract we see a (different) mediator adding to the agenda (again, this is likely 
to be drawing on the initial MIAM discussions), “what the mediation was set up for” (line 4). 
She elaborates on this: “what the arrangements are for the children and whether they are the 
right ones”. The agenda-setting thus has strong moral expectations of what is right in this 
context.  The mediator invites the participants’ “thoughts and feelings”; to say what they 
“hope to achieve”. Jacob responds with a list of aims (lines 9-15).  This agenda is complex, 
combining practical arrangements (extending contact hours, changing the location of contact) 
with emotional input “just to build up my relationship with the kids”, and a wish (line 9, 
repeated line 14) to “understand” Martha’s resistance. He concludes with “is there anything 
we can do to make it better”.  Jacob thus demonstrates his appropriate moral stance as loving 
father keen to improve his relationship with his children, struggling to understand – and 
thereby positioning as unreasonable – his ex-partner’s resistance to this morally appropriate 
behavior.    
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Martha is invited to do one of two things (lines 16-18): to either directly respond to 
Jacob’s agenda, or add her concerns. She produces an elaborate response to Jacob’s location 
concern, how this has been “already discussed” with solicitors. “Mr O’Neil here knows the 
reason”. This response draws attention to her reasonableness and appropriate moral behavior 
– discussions with solicitors - and implies that his reasonableness here is a performance for 
the mediator.  The use of formal language “Mr O’Neil” might be a way of distancing herself 
from the previous intimate relationship, or as a way of demonstrating competency in lay-
professional interactions (Atkinson, 1982; Edwards and Potter, 2001).  Martha then addresses 
Jacob’s first point, why the children cannot go to his home. For this she uses overtly moral 
discourse (Bergmann, 1998) – her belief, and “the moral of how I am raising the children” – 
importantly, not “exposing them” to Jacob’s “lifestyle”, even though she is “not judging” 
(line 28). Martha thus demonstrates that her prevention of extended contact is tied to her 
particular moral beliefs about parenting as a mother, and not to a more questionable general 
intolerance or prejudice toward her ex-partner as a person. She simultaneously underscores 
the agency of Jacob’s choosing this immoral lifestyle (Extract 2, line 13), which pre-empts a 
possible inference that he is the victim in this scenario and lacks the agency to alter the 
current state of affairs. 
2. Direct moral discourses: the problem of trust 
Martha’s direct moral discourse can be seen throughout their mediation session, for 
example: 
Extract 3: Martha and Jacob (40 minutes into session) 
1. Martha  you have to understand that this whole thing (.) blew up (.) because of  
2.   that hospital incident (.) and til this very day Jacob you don't  
3.   understand your mistake (.) I can't trust somebody that ok they  
4.   don't they don’t understand what they are doing is wrong and then me  
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5.   automatically just handing my children over (.) it doesn’t work like  
6.   that I have got to build your trust, I have got to trust Jacob I am giving  
7.   you these kids yeah? 
 
Martha tells Jacob that there is a problem with him not understanding his 
“mistake”, and therefore not being trustworthy.  She prefaces her assertion with “til this very 
day”, which frames Jacob as incorrigible, and strengthens her argument that he is not 
responsible enough to be entrusted with the care of ‘her’ children.  Here she addresses her ex-
partner directly as Jacob here, in contrast to referring to him indirectly as “Mr O’Neil” 
(Extract 2). In these mediation sessions, parties shift from addressing each other directly, and 
speaking to the mediator, often about the other party (Garcia 1991; 2010). In this way, 
complaints do not have to be articulated, yet a “complainable” can be present indirectly in an 
interaction (Schegloff 2005).  In Extract 2 Jacob talked about wanting to “build up my 
relationship with the kids”. Martha now talks about needing to “build” her trust in Jacob. The 
aim of mediation is often practical, for instance to agree contact times and locations, but for 
Martha the dominant issue is of being able to trust Jacob.  Her moral stance draws on her 
identity as a good mother who protects her children from inappropriate ideas, activities and 
relationships. Although mediation norms– along with UK family law in general – start with a 
presumption that close involvement with both parents is in the best interests of the children, 
for Martha, her moral concern trumps the obligation for contact (for analysis of the 
discourses around the child’s best interests in the mediation data, see Smithson, Barlow, 
Hunter and Ewing 2015). We can see the conflict between Martha’s identity as a good mother 
concerned with the welfare of her children on the one hand, and the mediation demand for 
her to be a cooperative ex-partner working collaboratively.  
The following two extracts are taken from a session with two mediators: 
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Extract 4: Kerry and Jack (10 minutes into first session) 
1. Med1  So (.) what's happening at the moment in terms of contact 
2. Kerry I stopped him from seeing him 
3. Med1  So has that stopped altogether  
4. Kerry  Until today (.) until we’ve sorted it out today because he lied to me (.) and  
5.                he has been sneaky (.) and I don't trust him (0.2) hhh (.) I don't like  
6.                being lied to (0.2)  
7. Med1 So would it be a good idea to just (.) talk through what you (.) what your  
8. Kerry [well 
9. Med1 [worries are about (.) not trusting him. 
10. Kerry  Well it’s not that it’s the fact that when he went on holiday (.) he left his son up  
11.   in (Jack’s parents’ home town) (.) without telling me I’d have preferred to  
12.   have known to have a choice 
 
When the mediator asks about the current contact arrangements, Kerry states that she 
stopped Jack, the father, having contact. She provides a justification (lines 4-5) – Jack has 
lied, been sneaky, she does not trust him. She also links this to her preferences: “I don’t like 
being lied to”.  As with the previous extracts, the contact problems are described in terms of 
moral and/or emotional concepts. Lack of trust, due to dishonesty, is relevant for Kerry as a 
reason to stop contact.  In everyday talk, blame constructions (Kurri and Wahlström 2005; 
Wahlström 2016) are often responded to with face-saving or counter-blame from the blamed 
party, who needs to account for their behavior. In mediation, in the extract above, the 
mediator steps in to deflect (or neutralize?) the accusations.  The mediator’s response here 
(line 7) is a suggestion they “just (.) talk through”, which may be an attempt to produce 
consensus, but the use of the term “worries” is received problematically by Kerry. The 
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mediator asks for details, drawing on a therapeutic discourse – “what your worries are about 
not trusting him”.  Kerry resists this shift of focus onto the therapeutic concept of “worries”, 
which is potentially hearable as not based in reality.  As Edwards (1999) showed, “worries” 
can either be constructed as realistic assessments of the situation, or as a subjective, even 
neurotic, personality problem.  Kerry produces an example of when Jack was not honest, in 
her view, during his time with the child. The trust issue here is not merely her emotional 
problem to be worked on therapeutically, but is explicitly linked to a parenting action which 
Kerry is unhappy with.  
Later in this session: 
Extract 5: Kerry and Jack (60 minutes into first session). 
1. Kerry   [I suppose more lies are going to keep coming out 
2. Med2   [It’s great that you have taken a step forward but most couples find it  
3.               takes a while to rebuild trust [and so trust 
4. Kerry                 [I don’t trust him 
5. Med1   And so trust is obviously a big issue for both of you isn’t it and (.) most  
6.    couples find it does take a while [to reach that 
7. Kerry                      [I don't know why he can’t not trust me  
8.               I have never ever given him one reason not to ever not trust me ever, never 
9. Med2   And what most people find is that they actually have to see things  
10.               working (.) that they actually have to see arrangements working and that  
11.               they actually have to see the communication taking place (.) in a different  
12.               way 
 
Kerry refers again to “lies” and the second mediator picks up on this moral discourse and 
reframes it to repair the conversation (lines 2-3), repackaging Kerry’s mistrust of Jack as not 
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realistically based on Jack’s conduct but rather as a phase that “most couples” go through. 
While Kerry views “trust” as an absolute quality which she does not have (line 4), the 
mediator takes “trust” as a goal for the parties to “rebuild”.  Kerry challenges this depiction 
using “never ever”, an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz 1986) stressing Jack’s 
limitations in this respect, and her moral blamelessness. Mediator 2 then suggests a practical 
change, which challenges Kerry’s position that Jack would need to first display himself as 
trustworthy before he can have access to the children. Mistrust is thus categorized as the 
normal experience of separation itself rather than as an objectively based, realistic and 
unidirectional concern about the trustworthiness of one particular parent. Kerry’s mistrust is 
normalized and generalized, rather than being seen as a particular mother’s understandable 
reaction to an unreliable father). The mediator, thus attempts to mitigate the couple’s 
disagreement, and makes them more mutually accountable, adhering to mediation values of 
developing mutually acceptable solutions, and avoiding moral blaming. 
3. Mediators drawing on moral ordering when there is a lack of progress 
In the next extract, with the couple from Extract 1, a mediator uses a moral imperative 
at a point of disagreement between participants:  
Extract 6: Jordan and Nicola (35 minutes into session) 
1. Jordan  I can't agree to that kind of access (…) So (.) um if we end  
2.                              up in court  (0.2)  
3. Med    Can I just say that you seem to have been doing a pretty good  
4.                              job up to now (.) you have got this very happy little chap  
5. Jordan  [yes 
6. Med  [that has a very happy time at both homes and you (.) you  
7.                              mustn’t lose sight of that.  
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Jordan disagrees strongly with Nicola’s proposed contact, “I can’t agree” and mentions 
that they might end up in court.  This hypothetical “so if” can potentially be heard as a threat 
of going to court.  At this point the mediator intervenes, with “can I just say”, a 
conversational practice which Silverman (1994) has linked to delicate talk, and Kurri and 
Wahlström (2001) suggest that conversational devices such as this work to demonstrate moral 
delicacy in conversation. The mediator focuses on the parents’ good work in parenting; 
despite the disagreements. This “pretty good job” is upgraded to “a very happy little chap” as 
evidence of the good job the parents are doing in raising their child.  The child’s undisputed 
happiness and good adjustment provide a warrant for continuing contact.  They have a happy 
child and “mustn’t lose sight of that”. There is a value invoked here within the compliment, 
as an explicit value of mediation, one set out at the start of the process, is that parties should 
focus on the “best interests of the child” (Smithson et al. 2015; Ewing, Hunter, Barlow and 
Smithson 2015). It may also be a rebuke to having lost sight of the mediation goals or norms 
at this point in the process. As with the previous extract, the mediator steers the participants 
away from talk of solicitors and courts; effort is made to improve participants’ 
communication out of court (for more on this, see Barlow et al. 2017).  
The same couple is in the next extract, at this stage the mediator is attempting to 
conclude the session, but the parties have not reached an agreement about child contact 
arrangements.  
Extract 7: Jordan and Nicola (60 minutes into session) 
1. Jordan   And what the Judge did say is that it was below the watermark and the  
2.   two of us better sort it out (.) and if we arrived in front of him again he  
3.   would frown upon it now I have tried everything (.) I have tried to  
4.   come to some kind of conclusion and agreement with you (.) and  
5.   there’s a paper trail to it (.)   
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6. Med              Um (.) hh (.) Uh obviously you two have got a lot of history and uh I  
7.                       don't know all of your history (.) um (.) and it it sounds like Jordan you  
8.                       feel (.) you feel that you have tried to talk. 
9. Jordan [I have tried 
10. Med              [and to mediate (.) Um (.) you are here, yeah you are both here today  
11. Jordan [Yeah 
12. Med             [and you are trying  
 
 Jordan is describing a past unsuccessful attempt to resolve contact disagreements 
in court.  It seems probable here that he is addressing Nicola as “you” in line 4, though the 
mediator responds.  He tells of the judge’s exhortation to them to “sort it out” and how he 
would “frown upon” another court appearance, “now I have tried everything” - an extreme 
case formulation used to legitimate his claim (Pomerantz, 1986).  The mediator 
acknowledges Jordan’s effort, and the long history. She suggests that the activity of being in 
the mediation session means that Jordan is indeed trying to “sort it out” (line 8), which Jordan 
responds to, “I have tried”, and she expands this (line 10), both parents are here, and they are 
trying.  They are making an appropriate effort. There may be no successful “outcome” to the 
session in terms of agreement over contact, but the parents are demonstrating moral effort, an 
appropriate orientation to the process.  The moral agenda of mediation may be distinct from 
the outcome-based agenda of the process.  
 The final extract is from another couple who have not managed to agree about 
contact after an hour’s mediation: 
Extract 8: Roberta and Peter (60 minutes into first session) 
1. Peter   Can I just ask, on that point, about sitting down to eat?  Um we (0.2)  
2.   that’s quite flexible if they are exhausted we are both happy for them  
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3.   to sit in front of the television (.) on occasion ↑bu utt  (.) you are quite  
4.   keen (.) and I am no you no I agree with this  that (.) with them sitting  
5.   at a table (.) to eat   [to eat as well (.) soo (.)  
6. Roberta           [Mhm 
7. Peter  [that’s something you’ve said    
8. Roberta  [Hmm. So what’s the question  
9. Med:  No, it’s it’s it’s an acknowledgement, I think. I heard her. No not you  
10.   both acknowledged that it’s important that they sit at the table  
11. Roberta [Yeah 
12. Med  [Is that right? Is that right 
13. Peter:  Yeah, that’s right. [yeah yeah  
14. Roberta    [absolutely. Absolutely, yeah.  
  
This couple is in the process of separation and discussing contact arrangements and 
how to agree on parenting rules for mealtimes. Peter gains the floor with “Can I just ask...” 
and elaborates. He draws on joint agreements, “we are both happy” (line 2) but… at which he 
describes Roberta’s preferences, talking to her directly (not to the mediator), “But you are 
quite keen” after which there is a series of conversational repairs, “I am no you no I agree” 
with the children sitting at a table to eat. Roberta provides a minimal response:  “Hmm.  So 
what’s the question?” At this point, the mediator intervenes. He reframes Peter’s missing 
“question” (set up in line 1 with “can I just ask”) as “an acknowledgement, I think”. The use 
of “I heard her” is a regular strategy in therapy or mediation, as a demonstration of 
acknowledgement – so the mediator is drawing on a therapeutic discourse here.  Then the 
mediator reminds them that they “both acknowledged that it’s important that they sit at the 
table”.  Here the mediator turns a potential disagreement into a reminder and emphasis of 
shared parenting values on the topic of “sitting at the table”. This reformulation elicits a 
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“Yeah” from Roberta, but the mediator presses for further agreement “Is that right. Is that 
right?” eliciting stronger agreement from both participants. We can see the implicit moral 
order throughout this discussion, in relation both to parenting practices, and to behavior in the 
mediation session.  As in Extract 5, the mediator here uses the clients’ moral ordering as a 
resource, evaluating and correcting them (Peräkylä and Vehviläinen 2003).  
Discussion 
We have studied the talk in family mediation sessions to understand how some of the 
inherent contradictions between competing core values in mediation, discussed in the 
introduction, are manifested in mediation talk.  We also aimed to highlight some of the 
mediator strategies employed to manage competing value systems in the mediation process. 
Some suggested strategies for mediators are included below, as bullet points.   
What sort of moral and values talk occur in the mediation data? 
In this mediation data, we see examples of explicitly morally loaded vocabulary 
raised directly as relevant by participants (trust, “the moral of how he is living”). We also see 
indirect moral “nudges” by mediators. For example, these mediators’ openings contain steers 
to appropriate behavior in mediation, and include assumptions of appropriate parenting and 
mediation values. This analysis highlights what constitutes the moral order for parents (what 
makes a good parent or partner, issues of trust, responsibility, reliability),  and the moral order 
within the mediation context (cooperation in the mediation setting, acceptance of the need to 
produce agreement, acceptance of the legal “no fault” discourse of post-separation parenting).  
There are other aspects of the moral order which may be shared, such as the focus on the 
child’s needs and wellbeing, but this is liable to different interpretation by parties and 
mediators. 
Mediators need to further their agenda of producing an agreement, or at least some 
“progress”, while parties appear to use the sessions for other purposes (e.g. here, blame, 
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accusations, morally loaded agendas).  The obligation to attend to two parties in this multi-
party interaction further complicates the process, as ex-partners take up the opportunity to 
revisit old arguments.  
The data illustrates the complex and sometimes contradictory discourses which 
emerge in the mediation process. For many participants, relationships, marriage and parenting 
have a demonstrable moral order and this may dominate other concerns. Two of the mothers 
here – Kerry and Martha – outlined their concerns about the perceived moral failings of their 
ex-partners as fathers. This morality of parenting and appropriate lifestyle is at odds with the 
mediation norm of starting by assuming equal suitability for parenting from both parties.  The 
stance of “no fault” in mediation may be a valuable ideal, but in practice it contrasts with 
participants’ moral order, in which moral concerns may “trump” the “no fault” parenting 
guidelines.   
       Training could focus on how mediators can acknowledge the importance of 
clients’ competing values and priorities, but while orienting parties to the primacy 
(in this context) of the mediation aims and the need for cooperation over future 
arrangements. 
Discourses of trust 
A complex moral discourse which emerged in this data is that of trust. This was 
alternatively conceptualized as a personal attribute, already proved or not in the relationship 
(by Kerry and Martha), or as a practice to be (morally) encouraged in post-separation 
parenting (by mediators).  We can see that mediators’ references to “trust” were received 
problematically by participants.  
      “Trust” may be an inappropriate or unhelpful word to use, even though it is central 
to parents’ concerns about contact arrangements.  This is related to our next point.  
Multiple agendas and discourses as a characteristic of the mediation process 
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The distinct and not always compatible agendas in this multi-party interaction can 
also be viewed as a problem of the multi-purpose nature of the mediation process. We saw 
how mediators may shift strategically between moral, legal and therapeutic discourses (Merry 
1990), or shift between pragmatic and emotional positions (Baitar, de Mol and Rober 2016) 
as a way of managing conflict and disagreement in the sessions (e.g. in Extract 4), but as 
these different discourses have specific moral orders, this may distract parties from the 
progression of the mediation goal.  Therapeutic discourse may seem appropriate in the 
context of parties’ orientation, but, as shown here, may mean that mediators attend to parties’ 
concerns at the cost of the other party, or of the mediation outcome.  In line with other 
discursive studies, we suggest that neutrality should be seen as an interactional 
accomplishment (Jacobs 2002; Patrika and Tseliou, 2016).  The practical doing of neutrality 
in mediation has been shown by previous DA studies to be problematic (Greatbatch and 
Dingwall 1989; 1990).   
Mediator strategies for dealing with moral and emotional concerns 
   Mediators may be more effective in presenting an appearance of neutrality if they 
acknowledge moral and emotional concerns but do not get drawn into moral or 
therapeutic discourse, instead reframing the topic into more outcome-oriented 
channels. This is important not just in terms of producing an outcome, but also in 
terms of the effect on the other party of focusing on blame constructions.  
Mediator strategies for producing agreement 
In all the cases here, ex-couples struggled to agree contact arrangements for their 
children, and our analysis demonstrated some ways in which mediators worked to refocus the 
discussion towards the mediation goal of producing an agreed outcome.   
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 One strategy which mediators used to deal with conversational breakdown was to 
focus on smaller points which all parties might agree on. This included highlighting 
shared parenting goals and achievements.  
 Another mediator strategy was to reframe talk of blame, or lack of trustworthiness, as 
a focus on what would be responsible or trustworthy behavior in the future.   
 
Orientation to power dynamics  
As the responses to the mediators’ openings demonstrate, parties’ perception of 
whose choice it was to mediate is relevant from the start in terms of power dynamics and 
feelings of mediator bias, but also in terms of commitment to the mediation “project”.  
 Who is invited to go first is important; as the first speaker may set the whole agenda.  
Moreover this is not neutral as it is usually the party who wanted mediation who is 
invited to go first. Mediators could take care to ensure that the second speaker gets the 
opportunity to outline their agenda first, before any attempt to respond to the first 
speaker’s agenda. 
 The mediator could avoid suggesting agenda items initially, but compromise by 
noting obvious or important missing items, if they have not been added by parties.  
 How parties are invited to set out their agendas is also crucial. In extract 2, the more 
open choice given to Martha set her off on an unhelpful track of reiterating previous 
arguments.  
 
This study adds to the recent body of work on interactions in mediation which can be 
used to inform mediator training and practice (Stokoe 2013; 2014). From a discursive 
perspective, mediators’ orientations, preferred outcomes, and adherence to institutional norms 
and values are inevitable, so in training an appropriate focus could be on how particular 
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discursive positions and strategies can help parties collaborate, and minimize disagreement 
without dismissing parties’ values and positions.  The detailed analysis of problem talk that 
DA facilitates can greatly enhance our understanding of “the complexities and the 
perplexities” (Patrika and Tseliou 2016) of the mediation encounter. Awareness of the details 
of interaction can help mediators reflect on and improve their practice, and we suggest that a 
DA methodology can specifically enhance practitioners’ reflexivity about their contributions.  
We have outlined some mediator strategies in the sections above.  Although this paper only 
draws on family and parenting issues, some of the practices and suggestions are also relevant 
to wider mediation contexts. The wider study also considered couples who were only dealing 
with financial issues, and differences in this type of mediation are discussed in Barlow et al 
(2017). 
There are also some implications for policymakers and mediation organizations.  
Much is claimed in policy terms for mediation (Barlow et al. 2017). It may be useful to 
clarify the primary orientation of the mediation process, and to accept the power dynamic – 
although family mediation is always supposed to be entered voluntarily, in practice as we saw 
here, parties often feel constrained to come by financial or legal aspects of the British family 
justice system (Hunter et al. 2015), even if they are technically “volunteers”, and this 
constraint is manifested in their discourse.  Another general point is the importance of all 
parties agreeing a clear, and shared, agenda from the start, rather than assuming a shared set 
of values and assumptions.  The explicit separation of therapeutic intervention from the 
mediation sessions (e.g. with multi-service settings) may enable parties to collaborate in the 
mediation project more productively.  
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